Monday, February 2, 2009

RA aka ESA

After reading chapter 14, there was one section in particular that stuck out to me; this section struck a chord after my recent involvement with an out of state project at work. Section 14-2 discusses hazard identification and the sources that can supply information that will create the most complete picture of a contaminated site’s history. This section essentially describes the work I do on a daily basis. As a hazardous materials specialist (fancy title for what I actually do), I spend most of my time completing Phase I Environmental Site Assessments (ESAs) in Arizona. Up to this point in my career, most of the sites I encountered have been fairly benign with a minimal amount of contamination usually occurring from leaking underground storage tanks at current or former gas stations. While for the sake of Mother Earth I am usually content not to uncover Love Canal on a regular basis, sometimes the monotony can take over and I wish I’d find something just a little more exciting than what I normally encounter.
Earlier this month I was able to work on a project in Dallas, TX involving the installation of new sewer line in the southern part of the city. While sewer lines are not exactly my forte, I was excited to work on a project out of state with different concerns and risks associated. While table 14-2 is specifically discussing the types of data that should be reviewed when working on a known contaminated site, the process for ESAs is very similar. In order to sufficiently assess the site, most of the items listed in the table must be reviewed for the complete identification of possible risks associated with the site, which may not be obvious. The text explains that by performing a site investigation, which parallels an ESA, a great deal of information can be gathered and ultimately “facilitate subsequent analysis.”
Due to the nature of the projects I usually work on (DOT projects with minimal subsurface disturbance), depth to groundwater in AZ (generally several hundred feet below ground surface (bgs)), the size and geology of the project areas I work on, any contamination I may encounter does not pose much of a risk to the project scope or surrounding area. In Texas however, there were several characteristics of the area which could affect how contaminants might impact the site: the depth to groundwater near the site was approximately 20 feet bgs, the geology and soils in the area differed greatly from the types I usually encounter in AZ and there was a creek which was located downgradient from the project area. Understanding the environmental characteristics of the site contributed to assessing the potential pathway for contamination, particularly important with the creek located only feet away and downgradient. The geologic and hydrogeologic assessment were important for painting a clear and complete picture to the client of why any contamination we found could pose a risk to the site and surrounding area. It was an important part of providing opinions to the client on what steps might be necessary if any contaminated sites were encountered.
Also important for adequately assessing the site for risk was understanding past land use and the history of the project area. The majority of the project area consisted of undeveloped, wooded land along the creek so at first glance, it didn’t appear that land use should be an issue. Obviously, if the site had been a former industrial plant, the investigation would have been geared toward that. This project taught me an important lesson on being thorough, however, no matter what the site may look like on paper. While finishing up the site reconnaissance I happen to notice something off in the distance which looked similar to 55-gallon metal drum. My sweet, naïve brain thought, “that can’t be a drum; we’re in the middle of the woods!” My Erin Brockovich brain, however, thought “That’s obviously a drum of a highly toxic chemical, likely contaminated the entire surrounding area and poisoning school children!” Turns out the truth was somewhere in the middle. Approximately 800 feet from the end of the project, an area of uncontrolled dumping was discovered. There were 55-gallon drums partially buried and rusted through along with other white goods and debris. One of the drums that was visible, contained the Dow Chemical logo and a partial label reading, “Hi-T” which after some Internet investigation was determined to be “Hi-Tri”, the shelf name for trichloroethylene. Because much of the debris was buried, it was not possible to uncover the extent of the dumping.

By performing a thorough site investigation and understanding the environmental characteristics and potential for the contaminants pathway, the client was given the information it will need in order to decide their next step. Understanding and informing the client that the geology and hydrogeology of the area will impact how any contamination associated with the dumping will migrate throughout the area is exactly what this type of risk assessment should provide. Like all risk assessments, a key factor is looking at all details and being thorough. If all of the possibilities are not investigated, details can be overlooked and risks may not be avoided. In this case, the client has been made aware of the dumping and will decide how extensive they’d like their phase II investigation to be.

Risk Communication, What Is Acceptable Risk?



Open up conversation during your next community meeting with these two photos and the topic of what is acceptable risk and it is likely to stimulate some lively discussion.


Nuclear power and the effects of exposure to ionizing radiation are well known however still pose a major source of misunderstanding and concern to the general public. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki aftermath of 1945 and beyond as well as the 3-mile island and Chernobyl accidents still overshadow many people when they are presented any scientific data that suggest there is a safe level of radiation exposure for the general public.
The below factoid is from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission homepage to summarize the amount of ionizing radiation an average citizen may encounter and the some general comparisons to balance other common life choices known have some risk.


The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also focused on the effects of radiation to the unborn child. In utero exposure for a pregnant occupational radiation worker should be limited to below 500 mrem for the entire gestation period. This level is well within the margin of annual background radiation exposure deemed safe for the general public.

So how does radiation effect us? It can injure, destroy or mutate cells and when discussing low level or chronic exposure, the concern is increase chance of developing cancer. These are the primary focal points when biology is applied to the science of measuring risk. With cancer being the second cause of death in the US (565,650 in 2008), radiation exposure kept as low as reasonable achievable and within the prescribed Nuclear Regulatory Commission limits is the best way to keep each individuals risk to the minimum.

As chapter 14 of Quantitative Risk Assessment suggests, addressing the human element is often the most important aspect of bridging risk related information from the science perspective to that of the public. For purposes of this, lets assume the opening presentation was to introduce the proposal of building a new nuclear powerplant in your backyard. Regardless of the potential economic stimulus for the community, the primary fear will likely be risk and needs to be addressed at the local citizen level. As wise public speakers advise, know the audiance and listen to them. Address their concerns in a way to allow them to undersatnd the science of the decision process.

Websites utilized:

www.nrc.gov

www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts149.htm

www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owndisp.show_document?p-table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=18341

Photo 1-http://www.google.com/images?q=tbn:inkOZDXb9CD-7M::Media-

Photo 2-http://www.our-energy.com/pictures/energy_facts/nuclear_powerplant

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Risk assessment tools are used by commercial, scientific and governmental entities for a variety of purposes. Even with their widespread use the is still much controversy over their validity and usefulness.

Proponents of Environmental Risk Assessment are often government agencies, the consultants they use, agencies regulated by such entities and political advisors to both.

Is this merely an attempt to shift liability? There is a vast industry of corporate and governmental groups making a good living off such studies.

Critics of ERA's point out the potential for abuse and misuse of such assessments. Some critics liken the process to that of a tortured prisoner. They claim the results will be whatever the sponsors of the study desire. A common criticism being that any result steeped in scientific jargon will retain the credibility of fact.

Consider the case of a large shooting range in the southwestern U.S. This range had requested an ERA when seeking to expand. They arranged for a government agency to perform an ERA and were shocked by the results.

Though the range intended to not only remain in business but expand the assessment was performed to CERCLA standards. This standard was at best inappropriate.

For the purpose of the assessment the range was split into 4 areas: the firing line, the target area, the berm and the downrange (beyond the berm) area.


All these areas are visible in this image of Rio Salada Sportmans Club.
For this study all the areas were assumed to be populated at all times. This is not a valid assumption. The areas users would be exposed to would be the firing line and to a much lesser degree the target area. The only exposure to the berm would be for workers at the range and even then limited to a few hours per month for repair.
Whether intentional or inadvertent the assumptions and errors in such ERAs must be minimized if a tool such as this is to remain viable in the future.

Environmental Justice

The purpose of the exposure assessment stage of the risk assessment process is to determine the exposure of the chemicals in question to the population.  Since one of the reasons that the risk assessment process is used is to determine locations of new facilities, an issue I'd like to discuss is Environmental Justice.

The EPA definition of Environmental Justice is "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.  EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across this Nation.  It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work."



There is evidence that areas near communities composed of minorities and the poor are disproportionately chosen for hazardous waste disposal facilities, mining operations, refineries, etc.  One well-known case is the US government's plan to use an area in the Western Shoshone Nation in Yucca Mountain for a high level nuclear waste repository.  This is despite the fact that this land has been recognized as Shoshone territorial sovereignty.  (map obtained from www.umich.edu).




There are many other cases of apparent environmental inequality.  A wood fired power plant outside of an economically depressed neighborhood of Flint, Michigan emits pollutants into the community through its incineration process.  The largest hazardous waste landfill in the US is located in Sumter County, Alabama where 1/3 of the residents are below the poverty level.  (The national average according to the US Census Bureau is approximately 12%).  Black residents in Sumter County comprise 65% of the residents in this county and 90% of the residents that live near the landfill.  Beard Elementary School in Detroit, Michigan has been sited to be constructed in an industrial area of town over land that is contaminated with various heavy metals due to years of use of this site as various manufacturing and repair facilities.  Not only that, but within 2 miles of this school there are 58 polluting facilities, 40 of which are hazardous waste handlers.  (information obtained from www.umich.edu).

      
www.thecrisismagazine.com

The issue of environmental justice is a difficult one.  Industries, manufacturing plants, and waste disposal sites need to be located somewhere, and it is not surprising that they end up where the land is cheap, the residents are unlikely to protest too much, and public outcry won't be an issue.  

Now imagine a manufacturing plant located near Beverly Hills.  Seems almost ridiculous, doesn't it?  But why?  Because the homes cost more? Does that mean that people who can't afford expensive homes should have to breathe in toxic fumes from nearby manufacturing plants and have their children play in contaminated soil?

It has been discussed in this class that science is not always at the forefront of risk assessment.  Political, economic, and social issues have an effect on the outcome of the risk assessment process.  So perhaps it is just a fact of life that won't be changing any time soon.  But that doesn't make it right.


www.rprogress.org

El Rio Research and Development Project






source for all pictureshttp://www.fed.maricopa.gov/Projects/PPM/environmental.aspx

The purpose of this assignment was to provide and understanding of a risk, how to assess if at a specific site and what the numerical estimates of the risk represent. Knowing my background with the diversity of plant material and environmental issues that effect wildlife habitats, biological necessity, and cultural resources, I wanted to understand the El Rio Research Project and processes. This assignment to you as a reader may be a superficial risk compared to many other catastrophic disaster such as exploring rail cars, Katrina or even a volcano eruption in Yellowstone Park.
El Rio project is sponsor by the Flood Control District of Maricopa in August of 2002. This project is a joint efforts between the District, the City of Avondale, Town of Buckeye, and the City of Goodyear. Other partnerships with the Board of Supervisors and has gained a great deal of support from federal and state agencies and focused on gaining the support of area residents. Therefore, the project team has identified their assessment team.
The study area consist of 17.5 miles of the Gila River from Aqua Fria River westward to the SR 85 bridge. Flood Control District is concerned with excessive growth of salt cedar vegetation in the Gila River bottom. Salt cedar is a non-native
plant that can be considered as an noxious weed that grows in dense stands, which can block the flow of water in the river channel creating a greater chance of the river overflowing and flooding nearby land, businesses and residential properties. One of the challenges is that salt cedar is hard to remove or destroy because of the density of vegetation and the well established root system and with the high content of salt in the water this let's the plant grow back fairly quickly.
Replanting the site with native plant vegetation may be the way of stopping the salt cedar from growing back.

The purpose of the El Rio project is to determine a cost effective method to replace the salt cedar with native vegetation historic grown on the river bed such as velvet mesquite, ironwoods, blue palo verde and Fremont cottonwoods, that would allow the Gila River to flow freely with a lower risk of flooding. The other concern is the plant densities with the revegetation a river bed how many different ranges will be set up for the number per acres is needed to keep the salt cedar under control. The other items that will be address in this project are maintaining sediment balance, removal of non-native species and reintroduction of riparian habitat, providing a reliable water source, ecosystem restoration, and preventing unauthorized land uses such as illegal dumping and destructive off-road activities. The results of this study could help future clean up projects along the Gila River and other waterways.
After reading the information onhttp://www.blogger.com/www.fed.maricopa.gov/Projects/PPM/environmental.aspx I was wondering if the research part of the project was complete. The last date I could find was March of 2005. The District was acknowledging an alternatives formulation phase. If you want more information contact the Flood Control District of Maricopa County 2801 W. Durango Street Phoenix, Arizona 85009 (602) 506-1501














When Risk Assessment is a Problem

An experience with a former employer was brought back to the forefront of my mind as I was reading Chapter 14, Quantitative Risk Assessment as assigned. In this particular case, an aerospace manufacturing company was making some process changes, and decided to move their contact cooling water outside and place into temporary containment (read: plastic kiddie swimming pools!) This was perfectly legal back then, in the late 60's. This contact cooling water happened to be contaminated with hexavalent chromium, among other constituents. This worked out well, until it rained and the pools overflowed into the small creek located 40 feet nearby. After a thorough investigation involving sampling and risk analysis conducted decades later, the EPA came back and stated that chromium was deposited in the sedimentary layers at the bottom of the creek, and that it was safest left alone in its current state and undisturbed. The best and safest option in this case, based upon the data and subsequent risk analysis, was therefore to do nothing.

In other cases, there are other reasons to do nothing, as noted by Debra S. Knopman in Waste Site Clean Ups in Slow Motion, PPI Backgrounder Sep 1, 1998: Under the current program, moving contaminated soil kicks in a plethora of RCRA rules--unevenly administered and often disconnected from environmental risk--that too often discourage actual clean up. More predictable regulatory treatment, commensurate with the risk, will contribute to certainty about economic consequences of failing to act responsibly.
Frustrated with a program that appears in many cases to be led by decisions that are arbitrary due to political or social wills provides a difficult environment for site owners, or more importantly potential voluntary disclosures.

Another issue involved in risk assessments of hazardous waste sites involves how EPA classifies a site, and the inherent difficulties created by that classification, as evidenced in this excerpt from the CATO Institute: Privatizing Superfund: How To Clean Up Hazardous Waste by James V. DeLong retrieved January 30, 2008 from http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-247.html:
(Superfund) protects against risks that might arise if the site were put to use in the future and if all measures to avoid exposure failed. The exposure scenarios used to justify stringent cleanup levels bear no relationship to present uses of the land and do not consider the possibility of restricting future uses. They are based on what exposures might occur in the future if the land were restored to unrestricted use. In other words, the risks that are to be protected against are all hypothetical and easily avoidable. They are not real risks that exist today. "The underlying assumption driving EPA risk analyses is that there will be new residential areas on existing Superfund sites where there are currently no such residential areas."
For example, one of the horror stories used in the current debate over regulatory reform concerns a site in New Hampshire at which the EPA forced the expenditure of millions of dollars to clean up the soil to the point where children could eat dirt 245 days a year. The criticized standard was set, applying the criterion of one in 1 million lifetime risk and using conservative risk assessment assumptions, at a level that would allow children living in homes built on the site to play in their yards… it ignores the more fundamental question of why the EPA insists on making that particular tract suitable for residential use. Industrial or commercial use, or nothing, would preclude dirt ingestion by children, and there is no shortage of residential land in New Hampshire.

In the assigned reading Quantitative Risk Assessment, the author numerous times makes mention that “the methods used in each of the four stages of risk assessment have deficiencies that can introduce a high degree of uncertainty and thus impair the validity of the results”. As a result of this, the risk assessment process is by design overly conservative biased towards public health. Perhaps as the risk assessment process gains more experience and a field of more narrow data, it will become more streamlined and flexible, to closer meet the realities that face the many different types of cleanup sites out there.

Not in My Backyard

One of the things that interests me most about risk assessment is the communication of risk and how risk is perceived by the general public. Public sentiment, economical and political factors as well as the inherent risk to the population and environment are all factors that must be considered when assessing a site for possible remedial action. In chapter fourteen of Hazardous Waste Management, Lagrega states that the public may see “The proponents of risk assessment as trying to convince people to accept risks that the proponents do not face rather than acting to remove them.” This is especially true in situations where the decision is to leave the hazard in place rather than to remove it. Such was the case concerning the Red Penn Sanitation Landfill located in Oldham County, Kentucky which is where I grew up.

I was particularly interested in this at the time because I was finishing up my degree in chemistry and had just started a job at a hazardous waste treatment storage disposal facility. The fact that there was a Superfund site right in our midst created quite a stir in my community. Nothing instills more fear in a community than the word “hazardous” and the fact that the hazardous material had been illegally dumped and the site abandoned by the owners only contributed to resident’s anxiety over just how harmful this site was. As result, when the EPA announced that the site was not hazardous enough to warrant the complete removal of all hazardous material from the site, people could not help but suspect that local politics and back door dealings were behind the decision. The fact that one of the polluters also happened to be one of the largest employers in the area only added to the sentiment that big company interests mattered more than the public’s health and well being.

The Red Penn Landfill covers 150 acres in the southeast corner of Oldham County. At the time, this was a rural, remotely populated area of the county. From 1954 to 1986, 85 acres of the property were used for waste disposal. Per lease agreements with original property owners and a license issued in 1968 by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, only sanitary waste was to be disposed of at the site. However, in 1982, it was brought to the attention of the Kentucky Department of Waste Management (KDWM) that several thousand drums containing paint waste, enamel wastes, drawing solutions and varnish had been brought to and dumped at the site between 1967 and 1974.



(http://www.kwalliance.org/Portals/3/pdf/floydsfork/ROD%20Red%20Penn%20Landfill.pdf)



Close up satellite photo of Red Penn Landfill. Courtesy Google Maps: http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl

In 1986, KDWM was informed by one of the owners of the landfill that suspected hazardous waste was found at the site. KDWM launched an investigation into the site and as a result of its findings, the owners of the landfill agreed to clean up the most obvious areas of contamination on the property. Sixty six chemicals were found at the site with eight chemicals identified as contaminants of potential concern. Those chemicals were cadmium, chromium, lead, cyanide, benzene, Lindane, bis-2-ethylhexly phthalate, and carbon disulfide.

Additional testing by KDWM showed that further action on the part of the owners was necessary but the owners refused to undertake any further action and in December of 1986, the landfill was abandoned. In 1989, Red Penn Landfill was placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List (NPL) due to the contaminants involved and the proximity of the site to local surface and groundwater sources—namely Floyds Fork Creek and the Laurel Aquifer.

Waste Management and Ford Motor Company were identified as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs). A Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) of the site was conducted by the EPA and in 1993, the EPA concluded that the risk to the community from the hazards at the site—the site had a Hazard Index 0.98 and a total cancer risk of 1.3 E-5--did not warrant a cleanup of the site under Superfund. The EPA recommended that KDWM work with the PRPs to properly close the landfill and a plan was put in place to cap the landfill.



Ford Motor Company's Kentucky Truck Plant (photo downloaded from company website: http://www.dipity.com/lascasas/The_History_of_Ford_in_Louisville)

However, as LeGrega points out in chapter fourteen of Hazardous Waste Management, “it is very difficult to explain these risks to the affected public……in part from the highly technical nature of the risk assessment process.” Therefore, it was not surprising that residents were unhappy with the decision to leave the hazardous material in place and simply cap the landfill. After all, those drums weren’t supposed to be there in the first place. The drums were illegally dumped there and should be removed by those responsible. Contaminants had not only shown up in the leachate ponds on the site, but in nearby creeks—including the fish in those creeks, in nearby springs, and the soil on the site. Many felt that if the landfill had been in a more high profile area—instead of a remote area next to the women’s prison, it would have warranted a more thorough cleanup. However, the decision to simply cap the landfill and monitor the area held and in September of 2001 the Red Penn Landfill was deleted from the NPL.

The perception of risk, when it is personal, can even skew the view of someone with a technical, environmental background who has a firm grasp of risk assessment. Case in point is my sister, who has a degree in environmental health and safety. As can be seen by the Google satellite image, the area around the landfill has been developed considerably.



Expanded view of area. Photo courtesy of Google Maps: http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl

My sister had considered buying a house on Riverbirch Dr which is north of the closed landfill. The fact that Floyd’s Fork creek ran right behind the property was an added bonus. She thought it would be a great place to play and fish in the summer with her little girl! My sister ended up buying a house in a different part of the county for reasons that had nothing to do with the landfill. In fact, my sister did not even know the landfill was there until I told her! After I told my sister about the landfill her perception of the area changed dramatically. Of course, now she wonders what unknown hazards may be in the area where she lives now!

Information for this post was obtained from the following:

http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0404239
http://www.kwalliance.org/Portals/3/pdf/floydsfork/ROD%20Red%20Penn%20Landfill.pdf
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar1112.htm

Risk Assessment Case: Bancolombia

After reading LaGrega's Chapter 14, I decided that the best way to put into context the information contained therein, was to apply it to a very controversial site remediation case going on right now in Colombia. I will describe the case in its entirety, based on the little information made public, and relate it to the different components that make up Risk Assessment as described in the "Quantitative Risk Assessment" chapter.


The case takes place in the port city of Cartagena. In the 1980's the Cotton Growers Federation owned vast areas of land south of the city, and used it as a hazardous waste land disposal area for obsolete pesticides, mainly organophosphates and organchlorines. In the 1990's, the Federation sold the property to the government, which later on sold it to Bancolombia, the largest bank and construction developer in the country. Little did Bancolombia know that when they started developing the land for residential use, it would be faced with an unprecedented site contamination case. This of course, brings about issues of responsible parties and at present none other than the bank has been held responsible for the site remediation.




The contamination was first discovered after nearby communities complained to the environmental authorities of bad odours and air contamination. At this point, little attention was paid to the complaints and the construction of 1,200 houses in the area began. As a result of severe thunderstorms during summer in the Colombian northern coast two years ago, landslides partially uncovered large quantities of obsolete pesticides in plastic containers. As a result of this discovery, the Ministry of Environment (the Colombian equivalent of the US EPA) decided to shut-down further construction and opened a specific case to determine the steps to follow regarding the site remediation.

The case was taken to the Chamber of Representatives by the bank and established a lawsuit against the Colombian Ministry of Territory for assigning the lands for residential development. At this moment, no result has come out of this. The bank, however, argues that the problem would have been avoided if a land assessment study would have been contracted by the government prior to the emission of the building permits, and if the complaints from nearby residents had been attended to on time (http://direccion.camara.gov.co/camara/site/artic/20060623/pags/20060623125302.html). At present, the Ministry of Environment has no rulings or standards regarding Phase I or II Environmental Site Assessment or Transaction Screening.



As a result, the government declared the bank the sole responsible party and excluded the Federation with no regard for the contamination that occurred decades ago or the inadequate hazardous waste management practices carried out by them during the 1980's. The bank then proceeded to contract specialized environmental consulting firms to determine what would be the next step for them. Since the bank is a public corporation, their contracting process is very long and complicated, but they finally decided to divide the site remediation process into two stages: 1) Hire an environmental consulting firm to carry out the entire risk assessment study for the site. For this part, they hired ERM and the assessment is still in process. 2) According to the risk assessment results, contract the most suitable site remediation technology out there to clean up the site. For this section, companies like Tredi and Veolia Environnement are in the process of submitting their offers for thermic desorption services. It has been estimated that the site contains a total of 2 million tons of contaminated soils. Since Colombia ratified the Basel Convention, the soil can only either be exported to Europe or in can be incinerated in-situ. However, for the in-situ option, the machinery would have to be imported into the country first, since that technology is still not widely available. One important issue to keep in mind, is that no consideration, except through ERM's study, has been made to determine the exposure assessment, contaminant transport/transfer/transformation, in order to assess the real extent of the contamination in the area.



Also, one of the most interesting parts of this case is how poorly managed (or who know intelligently managed) the risk communication has been. I am aware of the existence of this case because I work with one of the companies interested in providing the site remediation services to the bank. However, the majority of the population, including those living in nearby areas, are ignorant of the situation and the long process that is taking place to find a solution. The government and the bank have taken special care of the information, I guess in order to avoid public outrage and protect economic and political factors of the situation.





As far as hazard identification, exposure assessment and toxicity assessment are concerned, they to be determined by ERM, including risk characterization. Nonetheless, I am almost sure none of this information will be made public, and will be used only by the bank to make the most adequate and feasible decision. I must also add, that in short, the bank wishes to put this behind as soon and as quietly as possible, in order to maintain their reputation, put an end to the government's pressure, and of course, to sell the houses.



If you wish to read about the resolutions emitted by the Ministry of Environment ordering the bank to take charge of the situation, please click on the links below (I do apologize but they are in Spanish):

http://www1.minambiente.gov.co/prensa/gacetas/2007/febrero/res_0291_190207.pdf


http://www1.minambiente.gov.co/prensa/gacetas/2006/febrero/res_236_080206.pdf

Risk Assessment

The four stages of risk assessment for hazardous waste sites are hazard identification, exposure assessment, toxicity assessment, and risk characterization. There really is not just one stage that interests me the most. The process as a whole is very interesting. I am the lab manager at US Ecology Nevada, a hazardous waste disposal facility, where hazardous waste will ultimately go should it need to be removed and possibly treated. Working on the disposal end I am not exposed to the processes used to determine which contaminants are stressed for concern, which populations are potentially at risk for contaminants, how toxic the the contaminants are for human health and welfare, and the calculations of risks for all scenerios.
US Ecology accepts many different types of wastes ranging from outdated chemicals to industrial hazardous waste to large contaminated sites that are now declared Superfund sites. It is the Superfund sites that interests me. How it is determined which contaminants will be treated for, how big of an area will be treated, and how the treatment, clean-up, will be handled. Will the waste be remediated or must it be removed and disposed of in a proper landfill? These are questions I have always wondered about.
The EPA website explains in detail about the process for sites to be declared Superfund sites. The Hazard Ranking System, HRS, is interesting to me. This is the process of how potential sites are listed on the National Priority List, NPL, after a petition has been submitted to the EPA by the concerned public. The HRS uses a numerical screening system that assigns numbers to risks associated with the site. These are grouped into three catagories the potential for hazardous substances to be released into the environment, waste characterization, and who or what is affected by the release of hazardous substances. A site may score high or low depending on the seriousness of the associated risks. The HRS score does not determine the priority level of the site on the NPL, more in depth studies are required for a priority level to be assigned. This is just a small sample of what is needed for a site to be declared a Superfund site. More information is available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm.

Risk Communication - some myths and studies

I am sure we have all had an abundance of opportunities to be involved in risk communication in our lives – mostly as the perceiving public. But what does it mean to be on the other side - the messenger of potentially negative news to public who have a stereotyped reputation of developing paranoia on a pin prick?

Building on Chapter 14-6 from LaGrega et al, I researched some more studies available on the internet on environmental risk communication. Google took me straight to the website of Center for Risk Communication in NY, headed by Dr. Vincent Cavello. The website presented a featured article on “The Determinants of Trust and Credibility in Environmental risk Communication – An Empirical Study” by Richard G. Peters, DrPH, Vincent T. Covello, PhD, David B. McCallum, PhD that was published in Risk Analysis. 1997; 17(1):43-54.

But first, I found an interesting section on risk communication myths which I decided to spread across my blog for an interesting read. (Source: Risk Communication Guidelines for Public Officials, 2002 published by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Rockville, MD). Additional myths can be found on http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/risk/riskprimer/vision.html#%20myths

The essence Dr. Covello et. al’s paper is “What factors determine trust and credibility?”. Despite many theories floating around, their study appears to be the first of its kind that conducted an empirical analysis to validate the hypothesized factors. Visit http://www.centerforriskcommunication.com/publications.htm if you want to look at the complete paper. Interestingly, the key finding from the study was:

“It appears that defying a negative stereotype is key to improving perceptions of trust and credibility”

According to the paper, a testament to the above finding was the response of Johnson and Johnson during their 1982 tylenol tampering case. Johnson and Johnson defied the corporate stereotype, responding aggressively to protect the public health and safety by removing all its Tylenol product from the retail shelves.
Another interesting source that unanimously appears in risk communication is the website of Peter Sandman. Creator of the “Risk = Hazard + Outrage” formula for risk communication, Peter M. Sandman is one of the preeminent risk communication speakers and consultants in the United States today, and has also worked extensively in Europe, Australia, and elsewhere. His unique and effective approach to managing risk controversies has made him much in demand for other sorts of reputation management as well (Source: http://www.psandman.com/bio.htm).

There a are a lot of interesting resources and links to effective approaches to risk communication on his website. Most notably, there is a downloadable training video by Dr. Sandman himself on “Quantitative Risk Communication: Explaining the Data”. It’s a whopping 87 minutes long. The video link below contains the same video but you can watch streaming rather than downloading it. Happy watching :)